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RECENT CASE NOTES
BILLS AND NOTEs-GARNISHMENT-NOTICE AS DETERMINING, PmioPRry.-The
plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant and caused execution and
garnishment to be served on a bank holding as security a note payable to the
defendant and not yet matured. After collection of the note and payment of
the bank loan, a sum still remained to the defendant's credit. Subsequently an
assignee of the defendant's interest in the note by a separate instrument made
before garnishment, claimed the balance and was interpleaded. The city court
ordered thdt the plaintiff be paid the balance, but on appeal the assignee obtained
judgment. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Johnson v. Beikey (1924, Utah)
228 Pac. 189.
In the instant case the pledgor held no negotiable evidence of his interest,
and he was therefore not a holder. N. I. L., sec. 191. He could not
transfer the note by delivery as provided by N. I. L., sec. 3o. His assignee
therefore had no greater rights than the transferee of a chattel or an assignee
of a chose in action. The analogy of the chattel is strong in favor of the first
party to give notice. Sales Act, sec. 43 (3) ; Hodges v. Hurd (1868) 47 Ill. 363;
Riddle v. Blair (igo6) 148 Ala. 461, 42 So. 56o. The rule of first notice has
been applied to choses in action. Graham Paper Co. v. Pembroke (1899) 124
Calif. 117, 56 Pac. 627; contra: Thayer v. Daniels (1873) 113 Mass. 129; Salem
Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co. (1924) 44 Sup. Ct. 266. It has also
been applied to equitable interests of long continuing character. Dearie v. Hall
(1823, Ch.) 3 Russ. I; contra: Central Trust Co. v. West India Improvement Co.
(19Ol) 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387; see COMMENTS (1924) 33 YALE LAWN
JOURNAL, 767, and a criticism of the rule in NoTES (1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 5o.
Yet it is doubtful whether in reference to short term commercial paper, in a
known pledgee's hands, the criticism is applicable. This latter situation is not
complicated by a negligent trustee, an unknown or absent trustee, or several
trustees; and the requirement of notice would insure promptness in the pre-
sentation of the assignee's claim. While the courts have never attempted to
draw a distinction between the assignee of an equitable interest and the assignee
of a short term chose in action, such a distinction might seem to be justifiable
and might lead to opposite results in the two types of cases. In the latter
instance notice would not seem to be an unreasonable requirement to protect
an assignee of a chose in action from subsequent garnishment.
CARRIERs-ERRONEoUS STATEMENT BY CARRIER TO CONSIGNEE THAT CONSIGNOR
PAID FREIGHT-No CLAIM BY CARRIER AGAINST CONSIGNEE.-The Director-General
of Railroads sued the defendant for freight charges on goods consigned to the
latter f. o. b. defendant's city. The defendant pleaded that in reliance on the
"railroad's representation that such charges had been paid by the consignor, it
had accepted the consignment and paid what was due under the bill of lading
without making any deduction for the charges in question. The representation
was due to an innocent mistake. No assets of the consignor could be reached.
Held, that a judgment dismissing the petition be affirmed. Davis v. Akron Feed
& Milling Co. (1924, C. C. A. 6th) 296 Fed. 675.
Though a carrier has erroneously quoted an interstate rate greater or less
than that on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, only the approved
rate governs since any deviation therefrom would open the door to rebates and
other unprivileged discriminations. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R. v. York &
Whitney Co. (1921) 256 U. S. 406, 41 Sup. Ct. 5og; Forster Bros. Co. v. Duluth,
South Shore & Atlantic Ry. (19o) 14 I. C, C. 232; (1923) 32 YALE LAw
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JOURNAL, 734. A pecuniary penalty payable to the United States for any harm
which such misstatement may cause the shipper has been deemed a sufficient
deterrent Act of June I8, 1910 (36 Stat at L. 548) ; see Barnes, Freight Rates
and Charges (1922) sec. 6o5-A. But some courts have strongly intimated,
although not held, that the carrier might be liable to the shipper in a tort action
where it has misquoted such rate to the injury of the former. See Ga, R. R.
v. Creety (igo9) 5 -Ga. App. 424, 427, 63 S. E. 528, 529 (deceit suggested).
Especially when its agent misquotes wilfully in order to obtain the shipper's
patronage. See Savannah Ry. v. Bundick (1894) 94 Ga. 775, 778, 21 S. E. 995,
997 ("a cause of action of some kind") ; Melody v. Great Northern Ry. (IgIO)
25 S. D. 6o6, 614, 127 N. W. 543, 546. But although such intimations do not
appear to have been sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court, there are
exceptional situations where a departure from the harsh rule has been deemed
by some courts not to contravene the Interstate Commerce Act. Thus,
where the carrier has published conflicting rates effective contemporaneously in the
same tariff, the shipper is privileged to pay only the lower one. Dreyfuss v.
Pa. R. R. (1915, Sup. Ct App. T.) 9o Misc. 581, 153 N. Y. Supp. 966. And
so when the application of one rate or another is to be inferred from ambiguous
language. See Lakewood Engineering Co. v. N. Y. Central R. R. (1919, C. C.
A. 6th) 259 Fed. 61, 64. Or where the carrier selects the more expensive of
two routes. See Poor Grain Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. (1907) 12 I. C. C.
469, 47o; Hennepin Paper Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. (19o7) 12 I. C. C. 535,
537. The instant case rests on the narrow ground that the rule that both
"shipper and consignee are conclusively presumed to know the published sched-
uled rate" had no application. But it seems unnecessary for the court to have
reasoned from the fiction of presumptive knowledge. See NOTES (1914) 27 HARv.
L. REv. 737, 738. The true basis for the result should lie in the absence under
the facts of any loophole which would allow deliberate discrimination.
CONFLICT or LAWS-COLLATERAL ATTACK OF FOREIGN DECREE OF Divoac-The
decedent's widow applied to have certain lands set apart for her as a year's
support. The defendant's heir claimed that the plaintiff was not the widow,
since the Tennessee divorce from her first husband was obtained by false state-
ments of residence and defective service by publication. The lower court
refused to allow the divorce decree to be collaterally attacked. Held, that the
judgment be reversed. Green v. Whatley (1924, Ga.) 123 S. E. 871.
Non-compliance with statutory requirements such as residence and service of
process, subjects a domestic judgment to direct attack. But on collateral attack,
the court's "jurisdiction" is sustained by showing merely a general power to
adjudicate such cases. Welch v. Focht (1918) 67 Okla. 275, 171 Pac. 73o (defec-
tive petition); Louisville & At. R. R. v. Tally (1919) 203 Ala. 370, 83 So. 114
(unauthorized appearance of attorney); COMMENTS (IgIg) 28 YALE LAW JoUR-
NAL, 579; contra: Empire Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Coldren (91) 51 Colo. 115,
17 Pac. loo5 . But where the judgment of a sister state is involved, these sta-
tutory requirements are considered "jurisdictional facts" and their absence in
general renders the judgment attackable collaterally. Smithman v. Gray (1918)
203 Mich. 317, 168 N. W. 998; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Smith (1904) 185
Mass. 363, 7o N. E. 426; NOTES (1917) 3o HARv. L. REv. 640; contra: Kern v.
Field (1897) 68 Minn. 317, 71 N. W. 393. Compare Citizens' Bank & Trust
Co. v. Moore (1924, Mo.) 263 S. W. 530 (findings of probate court of general
jurisdiction conclusive); Lewis v. Klingberg (1923, Conn.) 123 Atl. 4 (findings
of probate court of limited jurisdiction open to collateral attack). Where all
the statutory requirements have been satisfied, the judgment, though procured
by trick or fraud not relating to those statutory requirements, is generally con-
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clusive against collateral attack. Christmas v. Russell (1866, U. S.) 5 Wall
29o; Chicago Ry. v. Callicotte (192o, C. C. A. 8th) 267 Fed. 799; NOTES
(19zi) 21 COL. L. REV. 268; cf. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co. (i922,
C. C. A. 7th) 281 Fed. 488 (relief denied for suppressing evidence) ; Levin v. Glad-
stein (i9o6) 142 N. C. 482, 55 S. E. 371 (fraud a direct defense under the
code). And this rule is adhered to though the fraud causes the court to find
these statutory requirements present though in fact absent Hicks v. Hicks
(1912) 69 Wash. 627, 125 Pac. 945; Thurston v. Thwrfston (1894) 58 Minn. 279,
59 N. W. 1017. However, as in the instant case, an exception is sometimes
made where recognition of a foreign decree of divorce is sought, and a col-
lateral attack for "fraud" allowed. Corbin v. Commonwealth (i921) 131 Va.
649, io8 S. E. 651; Davis v. Davis (1921) 70 Colo. 37, 197 Pac. 241; (19"22)
31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 548. It seems needlessly confusing to single out fraud
as the basis for the decision and overlook the solid ground of lack of juris-
diction. The result in the instant case might then have been reached without
an unnecessary impairment of the value of "comity." See Caswell v. Caswell
(1919) 84 W. Va. 575, IOO S. E. 482.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-STATUTE RESTRICTING ASSIGNMENT ,OF
EARNED WAGES WITHIN POLICE PowER.-A Maryland statute placed certain
limitations upon the assignment of wages. Md. Laws, 19o6, ch. 399. The plain-
tiff was the assignee of wages already earned, but the provisions of the statute
had not been carried out in making the assignment. The plaintiff sought to
collect the assigned wages. He contended that the statute dealing with wages
already earned was unconstitutional, as it deprived him of property without
due process of law. Held, that the legislature might provide restrictions upon
the assignment of earned as well as unearned wages. Wight v. Baltimore & 0.
Ry. (1924, Md.) 125 Atl. 881.
Some states under the police power absolutely prohibit the assignment of
unearned wages. Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919, ch. IS, sec. 2171; Burn's Ann. Ind. Sts.
1914, ch. 91, sec. 7987; International Text-Book Co. v. Weissinger (1902) i6o
Ind. 349, 65 N. E. 521. Although other states have passed statutes similar to
the one in the instant case, the distinction between earned and unearned wages
seems never before to have been raised in the courts. Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, ch.
23, sec. 3858; Burn's Ann. Ind. Sts. 1914, ch. 91, sec. 7999. See Cleveland, C.,
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Marshall (1914) 182 Ind. 28o, 105 N. E. 570.
CONTRACTS-PAYMENT OF LESSER SUM AS ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.-The
defendant paid for shipments of onions deducting a sum for those decayed and
notified the plaintiff that payment was "in full" of the amount owed. The plain-
tiff accepted payment and sued for the balance alleged due. Upon judgment for
the plaintiff, defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed as the dis-
pute between the parties was an honest one and the acceptance and retention of
payment constituted an accord and satisfaction. Schnell v. Perlman (1924) 238.
N. Y. 362, I44 N. E. 641.
In three comparatively recent New York cases a contrary holding is found.
Windinuller v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. (19o8, Ist Dept.) 123 App. Div.
424, 1O7 N. Y. Supp. 1O95; Kleinfelter v. Granger (1911, Sup. Ct. Tr. T.) 136
N. Y. Supp. 485; Frank v. Vogt (1917, Ist Dept) 178 App. Div. 833, 166 N. Y.
Supp. 175. These cases broke away from the established law of the .state. Hills
v. Somnier (1889, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 53 Hun 392; Jackson v. Volkening (19o3, ist
Dept.) 81 App. Div. 36, 8o N. Y. Supp. 11o2, aff'd 178 N. Y. 562, 70 N. E. 1IOI.
They were not followed in a later case. Hettrick Mfg. Co. v. Barish (1923, Sup.
Ct. App. T.) 12o Misc. 673, 199 N. Y. Supp. 755. The instant case settles the
New York law on the point and is in accord with the prevailing view.
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CRIMINAL LAW-EFFECT OF DELAY IN EXECUTION OF SENTENCE.-The defendant
was sentenced to fine and imprisonment. Through error the commitment read in
the alternative. The prisoner paid the fine and was released. When the error
Was discovered, the defendant was rearrested and imprisoned to serve the term,
although the time set for it had then expired. The lower court denied a writ of
habeas corpus. Held, that the writ was properly denied. ln re Birbiglia (1924,
La.) 99 So. 462.
By tlie prevailing view the time for the execution of a sentence of corporal
punishment is not an essential part of the sentence. Hollon v. Hopkins (1879)
21 Kan. 638; State v. Vickers (1922) 184 N. C. 676, 114 S. E. 168; 2 Bishop,
New Criminal Procedure (1913, 2d ed.) sec. 131o; se! 3 A. L. R. 1572, note. If
included in the sentence, it is mere surplusage. Bernstein v. United States (1918,
C. C. A. 4th) 254 Fed. 967. Thus it is held that suspension or delay in execution
of the sentence does not deprive the court of subsequent power to inflict the
punishment. In re Collins (i9o8) 8 Calif. App. 367, 97 Pac. 188; Terrell v.
Wiggins (19o8) 55 Fla. 596, 46 So. 727. Even though such suspension or delay
was unauthorized: In re Lujan (1913) 18 N. M. 310, 137 Pac. 587; Brewster v.
Piper (1918) 103 Kan. 794, 176 Pac. 626. Or if the execution of the sentence
occurred after the date set for its expiration. Miller v. Evans (igoi) 115 Iowa,
IOI, 88 N. W. 198; Middleton v. State (1923) i6o Ark. io8, 254 S. W. 342;
contra: People v. Shattuck (1916) 274 Ill. 491, 113 N. E. 921; Blackwell v. State
(1924, Ala.) 99 So. 49. Courts holding the contrary view deem it bad policy to
allow a sentence to be kept hanging over a defendant's head, enforceable at the
discretion of the court. In re Webb (1895) 89 Wis. 354, 62 N. W. 177. 'But
even under this view a delay is immaterial if caused by the defendant. , In re
McCauley (1904) 123 Wis. 31, ioo N. W. 1O31. It is suggested that a distinction
might be made in such cases between a reasonable and an unreasonable delay.
People v. Shattwck, supra. By statute in some states the inclusive dates for the
imprisonment must be fixed in the sentence. Del. Rev. Code, 1915, ch. 155, sec. 8;
McCoy v. State (1886) 14 Del. 433, 9 AtI. 416. By other statutes the execution
of a sentence of imprisonment begins to run on the day of the pronouncement of
sentence. Neb. Comp. Sts. 1922, ch. 35, sec. ioi95; In re Fuller (1892) 34 Neb.
581, 52 N. W. 577; see Corporate Authorities of Scottsboro v. Johnson (1899) 121
Ala. 397, 25 So. 8og (without statute). But even under such a statute a defendant -
has been denied a writ of habeas. corpus on facts similar to those of the instant
case. Sartain v. State (1881) I0 Tex. App. 651; cf. McCoy v. State, supra.
The instant case seems to represent the better view. The effectiveness of the
criminal law rests largely on the certainty of its enforcement To have allowed
the defendant in the instant case to escape punishment through a technical loophole
in the law, would have seriously prejudiced its effectiveness.
EVIDENCE-PRIrIL E AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN BANICRUPTCY PRo-
CEEDIN.-An involuntary bankrupt appeared before a commissioner for examina-
tion as to his assets and answered some questions. On his refusal to answer
others, claiming privilege against self-incrimination, he was committed for con-
tempt. He was granted a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that despite certain
oral answers given, he had not waived his privilege. The judgment was affirmed
on appeal. On rehearing it was contended that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion did not extend to an examination of a bankrupt for the purpose of obtaining
possession of property belonging to his estate. Held, that the judgment be
reaffirmed. McCarthy v. Aristein, U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. term, 1924, no. 404.
This case seems to settle the rule that a bankrupt upon examination may claim
his privilege against self-incrimination at any time. However, where he is required
to deliver books and papers, he is not thus privileged. Ex parte Fuller (1923)
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262 U. S. 91, 43 Sup. Ct. 496. As to whether there must be reasonable ground to
apprehend self-incrimination in bankruptcy proceedings, see (923) 32 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 512.
INJUNcTION-ExERcISE OF EQUITY JURISDICTION TO RESTRAIN CRIMINAL PRO-
CEEDINGS.-An ordinance imposed a license tax of $IOo a year on each moving
picture theatre within the city. The penalty for failure to pay was a fine, service
in the chain gang, or confinement in the city jail. The plaintiffs filed a bill to
enjoin a threatened criminal prosecution and to have the ordinance declared void.
The lower court denied the injunction. Held,. that the judgment be affirmed.
Burton v. City of Toccoa (1924, Ga.) 122 S. E. 6o3.
Where equity has obtained jurisdiction to test a statute, a later criminal prosecu-
tion involving the same parties and statute will be restrained. Ex Parte Young
(1907) 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct 441. It will also prevent harassment by a
multiplicity of suits resulting from repeated attempts to enforce an invalid
ordinance. Kansas City Gas Co. v. Kansas City (1912, W. D. Mo.) 198 Fed. 5oo;
Martin v. Baldy (915) 249 Pa. 253, 94 Atl. io91. Or, where "property rights"
are threatened by irreparable injury, proceedings under a void ordinance or the
misapplication of a valid ordinance will be enjoined. Clark v. Harford Assoc.
(1912) 118 Md. 6o8, 85 Adt. 503; Zweigart v. Chesapeake R. R. (1914) i61 Ky. 463,
170 S. W. 1194 (misapplication) ; contra: Arbuckle v. Blackburn (I9O2, C. C. A.
6th) 113 Fed. 616 (misapplication) ; Buffalo Gravel Corp. V. Moore (192) 201 App.
Div. 242, 194 N. Y. Supp. 225 (no injunction, if there has already been an arrest
or indictment). The Federal courts seem to have taken this exception for granted
in testing the constitutionality of statutes. Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) 247
U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co. (1921) 255 U. S.
81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298. The definition of property rights has been strained to include
the "right" to employment, to practice a profession, or to conduct a lawful business.
Truax v. Raich (1915) 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (employment); compare
dissenting opinion of Holmes, J. in Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42
Sup. Ct. 124. A modem tendency refuses to make the distinction between personal
and property rights a criterion of equitable relief. Ex Parte Warfield (1899)
40 Tex. Cr. App. 413, 50 S. W. 933; Huntworth v. Tanner (1915) 87 Washl.
670, 152 Pac. 523; Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation (1916) 29 HARV.
L. REv. 640; Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights (1923) 33
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 115. Likewise, it has even been suggested that the shadowy
discrimination between acts malum in se and acts inalum prohibitum should be no
bar to action by a court of equity. Fleischmann, Injunctions Restraining Prosecu-
tions (1923) 9 A. B. A. Joua.. i69; but see Huntworth v. Tanner, supra. So
where there is no complete and adequate remedy at law, equity has the power to
grant relief regardless of whether "personal rights" or "property rights" are
involved. But, in the exercise of that power, not only should the court be con-
vinced that there is a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the ordinance or
statute, and that irreparable damage will ensue, but also that the convenience of
relief to the petitioner, as an individual, will over-balance the societal need of a
swift and certain administration of the criminal law. The possible abuse by the
courts of this check should be no deterrent to its exercise in a proper case.
INJUNCrIoN-POWER OF COURT OF EQUITY TO ENJOIN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE Nor YET OPERATIVE.-A state statute provided for compulsory attendance
by all children at public schools. More than two years before the act was to
become effective the plaintiff, a parochial school, brought a bill in equity to have
the act declared unconstitutional and to enjoin state officers from insisting on its
validity at any time, on the ground that plaintiff was already suffering damages
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because of withdrawal of patronage. Held, that the act being unconstitutional,
preliminary injunctions be issued. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names v.
Pierce (1924, D. Or.) 296 Fed. 928.
Ordinarily the enactment of an ordinance or statute will not be enjoined.
Lewis v. Denver City Water Co. (1893) ig Colo. 236, 34 Pac. 993; Des Moines
Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines (876) 44 Iowa, 505. But equity has intervened
where the mere enactment would immediately occasion irremediable injury or
multiplicity of suits. Roberts v. City of Louisville (1891) 92 Ky. 95, 17 S. W.
216 (ordinance authorizing immediate conveyance of land to insolvent commis-
sion) ; City of Norman v. Allen (1915) 47 Okla. 74, 147 Pac. ioo2. After the
enactment of a statute alleged to be invalid, it has often been held that application
for an injunction to restrain threatened enforcement is the proper procedure to
determine the rights of the complainant. Ex parte Young (197o) 209 U. S. 123,
28 Sup. Ct. 441; Truax v. Raich (1915) '239 U, S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7; Halsey &
Co. v. Merrick (i915, E. D. Mich.) 228 Fed. 8o5. And even where there has been
no threat of enforcement, equity will take jurisdiction if the severity of the penalty
for violation prevents persons from attempting to violate. Terrace v. Thompson
(1921, W. D. Wash.) 274 Fed. 841 (determining whether a contemplated contract
violated the statute), It is difficult to see what would be enjoined in such a case
since the officers are neither acting nor threatening to act to the plaintiff's
damage. The injunction serves "only as a cloak to hide a mere declaration of
rights." See (1922) 20 MIcH. L. REv. 218. The declaratory judgment has been
used in determining the constitutionality of statutes in countries where judicial
control over legislation is similar to ours. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Attorney
General (1912, Austr.) I5 C. L. R. 182; see Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment
(i98) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io5, 136. The court in the instant case, in order
to attain a just result, assumed a power to make a declaration of rights under the
guise of granting an injunction. The benefits of the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure in such a case are obvious.
INSURANCE-ExTERNAL, VIOLENT AND ACCIDENTAL MEANS-DEATH BY TYPHOID
FEvER WITHIN PoLIcY.-A railroad company provided drinking water for its
employees. Through a defective connection with other pipes this water became
accidentally polluted, and caused the death by typhoid fever of an employee who
drank it. Suit was brought on a policy insuring this employee against death or
injury caused solely by "external, violent, and accidental means." Held, that the
insurance company was liable. Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. (924,
IL) 144 N. E. i61.
Recovery under a like policy has been granted when death was caused by acci-
dentally taking poison. Healey v. Mutual Accident Association (189o) 133 Ill.
556, 25 N. E. 52; Paul v. Travelers' Insurance Co. (1889) 112 N. Y. 472, 20
N. E. 347 (inhaling deadly gas); Johnson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (i1g5) 184
Mich. 4o6, 151 N. W. 593 (ptomaine poisoning caused by eating decomposed food).
The tendency is apparently to extend the doctrine of contra proferentein to justify
recovery in such cases. Its application in the instant case, however, seems to
contravene the manifest intention of the parties not to insure against "death by
disease" in its commonly accepted meaning.
INSURANCE-INCONTESTABILITY OF LIFE POLICY-DEATH OF INSURED BEFORE END
OF INCONTESTABILITY PERIoD-The defendant issued a life insurance policy which
was to be "incontestable after 2 years from the date of its issue." The insured
died within the 2 years and the beneficiary sued on the policy after the period had
expired. The trial court held that the incontestability period continued to run after
the insured's death and refused to admit evidence of fraud offered by the defendant
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Held, that the insured's death fixed the rights of the parties and that the evidence
should have been admitted. Markowitz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1924, Sup.
Ct. App. T.) 122 Misc. 675, 203 N. Y. Supp. 534.
On similar facts the Supreme Court of Michigan reached a contrary conclusion.
Becker v. Illinois Life Ins. Co. (1924, Mich.) 198 N. W. 884. Opposing theories
of the interpretation of life insurance incontestability clauses are thus exemplified.
The New York court overlooked an early decision of its own Court of Appeals
which assumed without argument that the incontestability period continued to run
after the insured's death. Wright v. Mutual Benefit Life Assoc. of America
(i8go) 118 N. Y. 237, 23 N. E. 186. This view has been adopted by a number
of jurisdictions. Monahan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1918) 283 Ill. 136, i1g
N. E. 68; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Hurni Packing Co. (1923) 263 U. S.
167, 44 Sup. Ct. go; see Head, Life Insurance: The Incontestable Clause (1924)
97 CENT. L. JouR. 40, 44. On this theory the insurer may seek cancellation of the
policy after the death of the insured before the expiration of the period cuts off
his defense. Ebner v. Ohio State Life Ins. Co. (1918) 69 Ind. App. 32, 121 N. E.
315; Harwi v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1924, D. Kan.) 297 Fed. 479. And if
the insured's estate is beneficiary the period is suspended pending appointment of
an administrator whom the insurer may sue. Ramsay v. Old Colony Life Ins. Co.
(1921) 297 Ill. 592, 131 N. E. io8. A few jurisdictions support the instant case.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. McIntyre (1922, S. D. Fla.) 285 Fed. 570;
Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. Aaron (ig4, Minn,) 197 N. W. 757. Under this
doctrine the policy will not be cancelled at the suit of the insurer, as there is a
good defense to an action by the beneficiary. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of IV. Y. v.
'Stevens (1923, Minn.) 195 N. W. 913. It is significant that New York and Illinois
have amended their statutes requiring 2 year incontestability clauses and now
permit "a provision that the policy shall be incontestable after it has been in force
during the lifetime of the insured for a period of 2 years." N. Y. Laws, 1921,
ch. 407 (2), amending Cons. Laws (igog) ch. 35, sec. ioi; Ill. Laws, 1921, p. 482,
amending Ann. Sts. (J. & A. 1913) sec. 6513. Thiese amendments in effect adopt
the minority rule as to the interpretation of the usual incontestability clause. The
instant case, without mention of the statute, interpreted the clause, which appears
in the usual form, as if it contained the expression now provided by the amended
statute.
LABOR LAW-INJuNcrioNS-STRIKE AGAINST MANUFACTURERS NOT CONSPIRACY
TO RESTRAIN INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES.-The
complainants were manufacturers more than ninety per cent of whose products
went into interstate commerce. The defendants declared a strike against the
complainants and engaged in picketing and intimidation, with the effect that the
latter were unable to fill regular orders, the defendants being aware of such result.
There was no intekference with the transportation in interstate commerce of
material consigned to the complainants nor of goods already manufactured nor with
the sale in other states of such goods. The complainants filed a bill for an injunc-
tion, alleging that the defendants' conduct amounted to a conspiracy to restrain
interstate commerce in violation of the Act of July 2, 189o (26 Stat. at L. 209)
and Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38 Stat at L.) 730. Held, (three judges dissenting)
that the injunction should be denied. United Leather Workers' I. U. v. Herkert
& Meisel Trunk Co. (1924, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. 623.
Although the line between interstate and intrastate commerce is blurred and
uncertain and often determined by the social end to be reached by the court's deci-
sion, the federal courts have unequivocally declared that an incidental and remote
interference with interstate commerce does not come within the purview of these
statutes. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 259
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U. S, 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 57o; Gable v. Vonnegut Machinery Co. (1921, C. C. A.
6th) 274 Fed. 66. But if a specific intent to produce such interference is com-
pellably inferred from the facts, the proximity or remoteness of the act to the
consequence is immaterial. Cf. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921) 254
U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172; see United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado
Coal Co., supra, at p. 408, 42 Sup. Ct. at p. 582; No1Es (1922) 71 U. PA. L. REV.
48, 51.
LIcENsEs-DIsTINGUISHED FROm EASEMENTS.-A granted B, by deed, the privi-
lege to maintain an encroachment of his building on the adjoining lot. In that
deed, and in consideration therefor, B agreed to permit A to enter on the premises
in suit to repair the side of the adjacent house. B transferred his property to the
plaintiff. The defendant contracted to purchase the premises, free of all incuin-
brances, from the plaintiff. In a suit for specific performance of the contract the
defendant claimed this "permission to enter" was an encumbrance on the title.
Held, that specific performance be granted, as the privilege was a mere revocable
license. Klein v. Stamler (1924, N. J.) 124 AtI. 366.
A licensee has a mere privilege of user, whereas a holder of an easement has
this privilege plus an immunity from revocation. 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d
ed. 1920) 1202. Whether the parties intended to create one or the other, is a
question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of the case. (924) 33
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 56o; see Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923)
i6o. Since the duty created by the document.of not interfering with the encroach-
ment of the building was continuing, it seems only reasonable to infer that the
parties intended the corresponding privilege of entrance to continue.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE-ANNULMENT FOR FRAUD.-The plaintiff, a Catholic,
married the defendant after she had represented to him that her former divorced
husband was dead. Nine years later the plaintiff learned that his wife's former
husband was living. The plaintiff, whose faith forbade such a marriage, sued
for annulment on the ground of fraud. The lower court sustained defendant's
demurrer. Held, that the demurrer was properly sustained. Oswald v. Oswald
(1924, Md.) x26 Att. 8I.
A marriage procured by fraud will be annulled only when the fraud touches
what is regarded as the "essentialia" of the marriage contract. Reynolds v.
Reynolds (1862, Mass.) 3 Allen, 605; Chipman v. Johnston (1921) 237 Mass. 502,
13o N. E. 65; Schouler, Domestic Rclations (6th ed. i92i) sec. 23. The court in
the instant case regarded a "mere disturbance of religious convictions" as not
touching the "essentialia." Wells v. Talham (1923) I8o Wis. 654, 194 N. W. 36.
According to the New York decisions any misrepresentation of a material fact is
ground for annulment. -And "material" is interpreted as in other contracts.
Kujek v. Goldman (1896) I5O N. Y. 176, 44 N. E. 773'; Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo
(i9o3) 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63. It is submitted that a judicious application
of the liberal rule would tend to more wholesome results without seriously
endangering the permanency of the marriage institution. Robertson v. Cole (1854)
12 Tex. 356; 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 209.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-CONFLICT OF LAWs-RIGHT OF AFTER-BORN CHILD TO
DECREE OF SUPPORT IN A FOREIN STATE-A decree divorcing the parties in
Missouri was silent as to children. The plaintiff had since resided in New York
with a child born after the divorce. On personal service of the defendant this"
action was brought to recover expenses for the support of the after-born child.
The lower court refused recovery on the ground that Missouri had sole and con-
tinuing jurisdiction. Held, that the judgment be reversed. Laumeier v. Laumeier
(i924) 237 N. Y. 357, 143 N. E. 219.
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By the majority view the father is under a duty to support his children after
divorce. Gilley v. Gilley (1887) 79 Me. 292, 9 Atl. 623; 2 Bishop, Marriage,
Divorce and Separation (18gi) sec. 1223; contra: Hampton v. Allee (I896) 56
Kan. 461, 43 Pac. 779 (decree, previously rendered, was silent as to father's
liability). Nor is he relieved of this duty because the divorce decree granted
custody to the mother and was silent as to support. Bennett v. Robinson (1914)
i8o Mo. App. 56, 165 S. W. 856; Viertel v. Viertel (i9O8) 212 MO. 562, II1
S. W. 579. The court which granted the divorce may decree increased support to
meet changed conditions. Harlan v. Harlan (igo) 154 Calif. 341, 98 Pac. 32;
Mack v. Mack (I919) 9I Or. 514, 179 Pac. 557. It can also modify its original
custody order when changed conditions require. Hill v'. Hill (I9o7) 196 Mass.
509, 82 N. E. 69o; Chappell v. Chappell (1907) 45 Wash. 652, 89 Pac. 166. So
also in the case of alimony. Meyers v. Meyers (igoi) 91 Mo. App. 151. And
if alimony is not asked when the divorce is granted, the same court will often
order it later. Crugom v. Crugom (1885) 64 Wis. 253, 25 N. W. 5. When the
wife and child have removed to another state after the divorce, the latter state
has modified the custody order in view of changed conditions. Griffin v. Griffin
(1920) 95 Or. 78, 187 Pac. 598; 2 Bishop, op. cit., sec. ii89; see 2o CoL. L. REV.
(192o) 491. When the original decree is silent as to alimony, it has been
obtained in another state on personal service of the defendant. Toncray v.
Toncray (910) 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977 (matrimonial domicile); contra:
McCoy v. McCoy (1921) 191 Iowa, 973, 183 N. W. 377. This is not a violation
of the "full faith and credit" clause, since the original decree is res judicata
only as to issues before the court at that time, and has no binding effect when
conditions have subsequently changed. See Griffin v. Griffin, supra; 54 L. R. A.
(N. s.) I54, note; 2o A. L. R. (1922) 815, 824, note. The "issue" in such cases
cannot be the question of alimony or no alimony, but must be the ability of
the defendant to pay determined by the then existing conditions. The court
which granted the divorce can order support of an after-born child not men-
tioned at the hearing. Shannon v. Shannon (19o2) 97 Mo. App. 119, 71 S. W.
104. Since the state of the new domicile will pass on questions of alimony and
custody when changed conditions warrant, it seems that the court in the instant
case correctly ordered support of a child domiciled within the state, a problem
the Missouri court may fairly be said not to have decided. As the child if
not supported would be a public charge, New York has an interest in its
support. Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits (1921) 7 CORN. L.
QUART. i. Furthermore, to force the mother to bring her action in a court a
thousand miles from her domicile would seem scarcely justified by the mere
fact that she was divorced in that court. The territorial theory of "sole juris-
diction" is thus again denied.
PLEADING-UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY-FAILURE TO ALLEGE LACK OF ADE-
QUATE REmEDY AT LAw.-The complaint set forth an oral agreement to lease
for two years and requested specific performance by the lessee. The lessee
pleaded a general denial and the Statute of Frauds and moved for judgment
on the pleadings. Held, that the motion be granted with leave to amend since
the plaintiff failed to allege he had no adequate remedy at law, Daly v.
-Sobieski (1924, Sup. Ct Spec. T.) 123 Misc. 176, 204 N. Y. Supp. 546.
the codifiers intended to effect a blended system of law and equity "so that
the same form of allegation may be adapted to cases which have heretofore
been distinguished as legal and equitable." First Report of Commissioners
(1848) 75, 76. Hence, the code provided that distinctions between actions at
law and suits in equity be abolished and that there be but one form of civil
action. N. Y. C. P. A. 1924, sec. 8. In this action a simple story of the
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facts of the controversy stated the cause of action. First Report. of Com-
inissioners, supra, sec. 12o; Theiling v. Marshall (IgIO, 2d Dept.) 14o App. Div.
134, 124 N. Y. Supp. io66. It was the narrative of historical events between
the parties. Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAw JouRNAL,
817. Viewed in this light, the allegation that the plaintiff had no adequate
remedy at law does not seem a necessary part of the cause of action. See gen-
erally, Costigan, The Spirit of Code Pleading (1917) II ILL. L. REv. 517. Even
as regards the remedy, the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief if it
appeared from the facts that he had no adequate remedy at law. Pine Cliffs
Farins v. Collier (1915, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 92 Misc. 269, 156 N. Y. Supp. 293;
Finance Corp. v. Scard (1924) IOO Conn. 712, 124 Atl. 715. The cases relied
on in the instant opinion support no more rigid rule. See the language in
Bateman v. Straus (19o3, 2d Dept.) 86 App. Div. 540, 83 N. Y. Supp. 785.
The prayer for relief is no part of the cause of action. McVey v. Security
Ins. Co. (1907, 3d Dept.) 118 App. Div. 466, lO3 N. Y. Supp. io56; Pomeroy,
Code Remedies (4th ed. 19o4) 665. Compare Cofin. Gen. Sts. 1918, ch. 294,
sec. 5672, 5673. Even where law and equity have not been blended, if the
cause of action did not warrant the equitable relief prayed for, the complaint
was not dismissed but transferred to the law side of the court. Birmingham
Sawmill Co. v. So. Ry. (1923) 21o Ala. 126, 97 So. 78. Similarly in New York
the case was transferred to the jury calendar. Doctor v. Reiss (1917, Ist Dept.)
i8o App. Div. 62, 167 N. Y. Supp. 193. The Appellate Division has gone so
far as to order a dismissal in a similar case. Poth v. Washington Sq. Church
(1923, Ist Dept.) 2o7 App. Div. 219, 2oi N. Y. Supp. 776. But that case
seems to be based on a misconstruction of Jackson v. Strong (1917) 222 N. Y.
i49, 118 N. E. 512. The latter ordered a new trial, not a dismissal. Simi-
larly Saperstein v. Mechanics' & Farmers' Bank (1920) 228 N. Y. 257, 126 N. E.
708. In the instant case a dismissal was not ordered, but even judgment on the
pleading with leave to amend seems too drastic. At best the cause should have
been transferred to the jury calendar. Doctor v. Reiss, supra. And since the
code provides that, an answer having been made, the court may permit the
complainant to take any relief consistent with the issue raised, the result
reached seems the more remarkable. N. Y. C. P. A. 1924, sec. 479; Marquat
v. Marquat (1855) 12 N. Y. 336; NoTEs (924) 24 Coi. L. REV. 286, 289. The
code was more liberally construed seventy-five years ago. See Phillips v. Gor-
ham (1858) 17 N. Y. 270.
PUBLIC SERVICE LAW-WHOLESALER AS PUBLIC SERVICE COPoRATIoN.-The
defendant was engaged in generating electricity which it sold exclusively to
two public service companies who in turn sold to the public. The defendant
formerly held most of the stock in these companies, and upon application of
a purchaser from the distributing companies to force filing of rates and charges
was declared a public service corporation. The Public Utilities Commission
ordered the defendant to file its rates and the latter appealed, setting up as a
defense that since the previous decree it had sold to its stockholders the stock
it held in the subsidiary companies. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the sale
of stock restored the status of private corporation. Southern Ohio Power
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (1924, Ohio) 143 N. E. 760.
Apart from the question of whether the fiction of corporate entity should be
observed in determining questions of public policy is the problem as to the
status of any wholesaler of the type here involved. It is well recognized that
if an owner devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest
he must submit to public control. Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
Wholesalers of this type have been held to be public service corporations on
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such grounds. Salisbury & S. Ry. v. Southern Power Co. (1920) 179 N. C.
330, 102 S. E. 625 (power); Acquackanonk Water Co. v. Board of Public
Utility Comfrs. (1922) 97 N. J. L. 366, 118 At1. 535 (water) ; but cf. Colorado
Power Co. v. Haldermann (1924, D. Colo.) 295 Fed. 178, 194, Some stat-
utes constitute such wholesalers public service corporations. Okla. Comp. Sts.
1921, sec. 3462. ("every corporation ..... that may supply any commodity to
be furnished to the public"). Southern Oklahoma Power Co. v. Corporation
Commission (1923) 96 Okla. 53, 220 Pac. 370. The constitutionality of such a
statute may still be attacked as an unwarranted exercise of the police power,
depriving one of property without due process of law. See Clarksburg Light
& Heat Co. v. Public Service Commission (1919) 84 W. Va. 638, oo S. E. 551.
Acceptance of a charter conferring the right of eminent domain is held to- sub-
ject a wholesaler to public regulation. North Carolina Public Service Co. v.
Southern Power Co. (1922, C. C. A. 4th) 282 Fed. 837. But it is held the
wholesaler must have been a public service corporation anyhow or the grant
of eminent domain would have been void. Bridal Veil Lumbering Co. v. John-
son (1896) 30 Or. 205, 46 Pac. 790; contra: Burdick, Origin of Public Service
Duties (1911) nx COL. L. Rav. 514, 617. See NoTs (1920) 26 W. VA, L. QuART.
140. 'The public has just as much interest in the regulation of wholesalers of
this sort as it has in retailers. It appears difficult to reconcile the instant case
with the same court's earlier views. Ohio Mining Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission (1922) io6 Ohio St. 138, 14o N. E. 143.
REAL PROPERTY-EASEMENT BY IMPLIED RESERVATION-EQUIREMENT OF PER-
MANENCY.-The plaintiff conveyed to the defendant that part of his lot across
which a switch ran to the plaintiff's coal-yard, located on the retained part of the
same lot. No mention of the switch was made in the deed. The plaintiff claimed
an easement to use it by implied reservation, and secured an injunction prohibiting
the defendant from interfering with such use. Held, that the decree be reversed
since the way claimed was not "permanent." Naunan v. Treen Box Co. (1924,
Pa.) 124 Atl. 349.
In holding that an easement may be reserved, as well as granted, by implication,
the Pennsylvania courts are opposed to the English and the prevailing American
views. See COMMENTS (1911) 9 MicH. L. REV. 709-712; 26 L. R. A. (N. s.)
315-377, note. In determining whether an easement is created by implication, the
intention of the parties is generally regarded as determinative. 2 Tiffany,. Real
Property (2d ed. 192o) i27o-I272. But the courts, not recognizing that the inten-
tion of the parties is primarily a matter of construction, have enumerated essential
characteristics which the easement must have in order to be granted or reserved
by implication. 2 Tiffany, op. cit., 1273. Thus it is generally required that the
user of the servient lot be "obvious, continuous, permanent and necessary." 2
Tiffany, op. cit., sec. 363. This has been the rule in Pennsylvania. Liquid Car-
bonic Co. v. Wallace (19o8) 219 Pa. 457, 68 Atl. 1021. It seems that the only
justifiable use of these test characteristics is collectively as a mere index of the
intention of the parties. The instant case, however, goes much further and
isolates one of these characteristics, "permanency," and applies it as an inde-
pendent test, holding that since the way for the switch might have been terminated
by the act of the city in closing the street, or by that of the railroad in removing
the track with which the switch connected it was not of a "permanent" nature.
Such a test for arriving at the intention in fact of the parties seems arbitrary.
Other courts have used "permanent" as a test, but seemingly as supplementary to
"obvious and continuous," all taken collectively as being a mere index to the inten-
tion of the parties. See German Savings & Loan Soc. v. Gordon (1908) 54 Or.
147, 102 Pac. 736; Hoepker v. Hoepker (1923) 309 Ill. 407, 141 N. E. i59; Jones,
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Easements (1898) sec. 145; (1912) 56 SOL. JOUR. 717-718. Some courts have
failed to mention "permanency" as a requisite, probably considering it superfluous.
McCleary v. Lourie (1922, N. H.) 117 At. 73o; DeConley v. Winter Creek Coal
Co. (1923, Neb.) 193 N. W. 157. The holding in the instant case is hard to
reconcile with a later case in the same court, in which it was said that a telephone
or telegraph line was a "permanent" easement. See Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Bell
(924, Pa.) 124 Atl. 351. While the conclusion arrived at by the court accords
with the general feeling that a grantor should not be allowed to derogate from
his grant, the reasoning seems unfortunate. If the intention of the parties in fact
is the governing factor, it ought to be determined by the facts and circumstance
of the transaction, and not by mere test words or labels.
REAL PROPERTY-EASEMENTS IN STRUCTURES-EXTINGUISHMENT BY DESTRUCTION
OF SERVIENT ESTATE-The complainant, lessee of rooms in the second floor of a
building, had an easement of passage through a doorway to an adjoining building.
The latter building was accidentally destroyed by fire, but was later rebuilt with
the doorway as before, the door now being kept locked. On the ground that the
easement was not revived in the new building, the lower court denied the com-
plainant's prayer to have the door opened, and the complainant appealed. Held,
that the judgment be affirmed. Rudderham v. Emery Bros. (1924, R. I.) .125
At. 291.
Easements confined to structures are extinguished when the servient estate is
destroyed without fault of the servient tenant. Shirley v. Crabb (1894) 138 Ind.
200, 37 N. E. 13O; see (1918) 6 CALIF. L. REv. 299. But an easement is not
affected by the destruction of the servient structure, if it is also appurtenant to the
soil. Citizens' Electric Co. v. Davis (igio) 44 Pa. Super. 138 (plank road washed
away, easement held undisturbed). Also easements in structures remain in
existence if enough of the structure is left on which the easement can operate.
Commercial Bank of Ogden v. Eccles (1913) 43 Utah, 91, 134 Pac. 614; (1913)
13 COL. L. REv. 754. Where the easement is confined to a structure which is
accidentally destroyed, the servient owner is under no duty to rebuild for the
benefit of the dominant estate. Heartt v. Kruger (189o) 121 N. Y. 386, 24 N. E.
841. Even if the servient tenant does rebuild as before the legal relations con-
stituting the easement are not revived. Brechet v. Johnson Hardware Co. (1918)
139 Minn. 436, 166 N. W. io7o; contra: Douglas v. Coonley (1898) 156 N. Y.
521, 5I N. E. 283; Washburn Easements & Servitudes (4th ed. 1885) 733; cf.
Campbell v. Mesier (182o, N. Y.) 4 John. Ch. *334. To hold otherwise would
unduly restrict the development of land in a complex and continually changing
civilization. Bowhay v. Richards (i9o8) 8r Neb. 764, 768, 116 N. W. 677, 678.
The facts in Douglas v. Coonley suggest that it may not be contrary to the general
view, for after the destruction of their adjoining buildings by fire, the parties
rebuilt the structures simultaneously, the dominant tenant relying on the servient
tenant's apparent intention to resume the former relations and making no allow-
ances otherwise in rebuilding. Cf. Day v. Caton (1876) iig Mass. 513. The
possibility of imposing an obstruction on the development of land has even led
some courts to hold that the easement rights are terminated by the servient
owner's voluntary destruction of his estate and that they are not revived in the
riew building. Union Bank of Lowell v. Nesmith (1921) 238 Mass. 247, 13o N. E.
251; see (1921) 19 Mica. L. REv. 876. The instant case is in accord with the
general tendency of the common law to discourage incumbrances on property
interests.
SALES-SALE OF FOOD BY RESTAURANT-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNES.-The
plaintiff contracted ptomaine poisoning from eating unwholesome fish in the
defendant's restaurant. She recovered damages in the lower court on the theory
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that the transaction constituted a sale and a breach of an implied warranty of
wholesomeness. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Temple v. Keeler (1924)
238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635.
Service of food at a restaurant or eating house has been held not to be a
sale, but a mere grant of a privilege of consumption. Sheffer v. Willoughby
(1896) 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. E. 253; Beale, Innkeepers and Hotels (19o6) sec. 169;
see COMMENT (1918) 17 MICH. L. REV. 261. Courts following this view deny
the existence of a warranty of wholesomeness of food served. Merrill v. Hodson
(1914) 88 Conn. 314, 91 At. 533; (1914) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 73. And
make negligence the only ground for recovery. Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R.
(1912) iib Me. 1o5, 85 AtI. 396; Travis v. Louisville R. R. (1913) 183 Ala.
415, 62 So. 851; 32 HARV. L. REv. 71. The basis for this reasoning grows
weaker as the price per article becomes more specific. See Valeri v. Pullman
(1914, S. D. N. Y.) 218 Fed. 519, 520. Other courts hold service of food a
sale, and by attaching a warranty thereto, impose absolute liability. Smith v.
Carlos (1923, Mo.) 247 S. W. 468; Friend v. Childs (igi8) 231 Mass. 65, 120
N. E. 407. In interpreting statutes, the courts have prohibited any transaction
which the legislature intended to prohibit. Thus, the offense of "selling" articles
the sale of which is prohibited by statute has been committed by service of
such articles at an eating house. Commonwealth v. Warren (1894) i6o Mass.
533, 36 N. E. 308 (impure milk with meals); People v. Clair (1917) 221 N. Y.
io8, 116 N. E. 868 (partridges served out of season); (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 140. Or by the conclusion of a contract for a future sale. Ciocca-
Lombardi Wine Co. v. Fucini (1923, ist Dept.) 204 App. Div. 392, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 114 (contract for sale of liquor). Or by a transaction resembling
a sale but lacking legal effect because of prohibitory legislation denying the
privilege to acquire such goods. Grande v. Eagle Brewing Co. (1922) 44 R. 1.
424, 117 Atl. 640 (liquor). In Canavan v. City of Mechanieville (1920) 229
N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882, the New York court held there was a "sale" of water
furnished by a city but refused to find a warranty of its fitness for use. In
protecting the customer the instant case seems sound. See Perkins, Unwhole-
some Food as a Source of Liability (I919) 5 IOWA L. BUIL. 6, 86. But it is
unfortunate that the court felt called upon to term the transaction a "sale."
The courts should squarely consider whether or not they desire liability. By
introducing the question of "sale" or "no sale," they are likely to strengthen a
tendency to reason about labels Tather than about issues. See City of San
Francisco v. Larsen (1913) 165 Calif. 179, 131 Pac. 366; Loucks v. Morley
(1919) 39 Calif. App. 570, 179 Pac. 529; COMMENT (1919) 7 CALIF. L. REV. 360.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-PERSONAL SERVICES COMPENSABLE IN MONEY INSUF-
FICIENT TO TAKE ORAL CONTRACT TO CONVEY LAND OUT OF THE STATUTE, OF
FRAUDS.-In consideration of an oral promise to will her all his real and personal
property on his death, the plaintiff lived with and cared for Joseph Wooley for
six years, until his death. She brings this action for an injunction restraining
partition" of the estate of the deceased by his heirs, and prays specific performance
of the contract. The lower court granted this relief. Held, that the decree be
reversed. Newbold v. Michael (1924, Ohio) 144 N. E. 715.
Where personal services are of such character as to be incapable of estimation
by a pecuniary standard, specific performance of oral contracts to convey land
will be decreed in many states. Svanburg v. Fosseen (899) 75 Minn. 350, 78
N. W. 4 (niece living with and caring for uncle and aunt); Bryson v. McShane
(19oo) 48 W. Va. 126, 35 S. E. 848 (living with and caring for an old person).
Otherwise where such services can be compensated in money. Grant v. Grant
(1893) 63 Conn. 530, 29 Atl. 15; Walker v. Dill's Adn'r (192o) 186 Ky. 638,
212
RECENT CASE NOTES
218 S. W. 247. In such case the remedy is on a quantum meruit for the value of
the services, regardless of the value of the property. Ellis v. Cary (1889) 74
Wis. i76, 42 N. W. 252; 2 Reed, Statute of Frauds (1884) sec. 623. The instant
case seems to follow the Ohio doctrine that services of this nature can be com-
pensated for in money damages and will not entitle the plaintiff to specific
performance. See Shahan v. Swan (I89I) 48 -Ohio St. 25, 40, 26 N. E. 222, 226.
TORTS-PROCURING BR.AcH OF CONTRA 1-JUSTIFIABL.E INTERFERENCE By TRADE
UNIoN.-The plaintiff was the manager df a touring theatrical company. The
defendant committee of allied unions of theatrical artists and employees procured
one of the defendants, proprietor of a provincial theatre, to break his contract
with the plaintiff, on the ground that the plaintiff was not paying his touring
company wages compatible with a decent livelihood. Held, that the action be
dismissed. Brimelow v. Casson (1923, Ch. Div.) 13o L. T. R. 725.
To knowingly procure a breach of an existing contract is prima facie a tort.
The plaintiff is said to have a "property right," i. e. a right in rem, against any
third person that he shall not without "just cause" induce breach'of existing con-
tracts. Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell (1917) 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup.
Ct. 65; Northwestern Wisconsin Co-op Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal et at (1924,
Wis.) 197 N. W. 936. The determination of what constitutes "just cause" involves
a balancing of social and economic interests, and so must be worked out by the
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. COMMENTS (1922) 32 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, i7I; Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HAv. L. REV. 663.
The desire to win in a competitive business struggle is not "just cause." Lumley
v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 El. & BL. 216; Cumberland Glass Manufacturing Co. v.
Dewitt (1913) 12o Md. 381, 87 Atl. 927. Nor where the defendant causes the
breach by merely making a contract with a third party, the necessary result of
which he knows will be the breach of the original contract. Martens v. Reilly
(igoi) iog Wis. 464, 84 N. W. 840; contra: Biggers v. Mathews (19o8) 147
N. C. 299, 61 S. E. 55. The language of some of the courts would almost exclude
any justification for wilful interference with others' contractual rights. But there
is a close analogy between this problem and that involved in privileged defamation.
It has been held that procuring a breach of contract to marry is privileged.
Homan v. Hall (1917) io2 Neb. 70, 65 N. W. 881; Guida v. Pontrelli (I92,
Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 114 Misc. i8i, 186 N. Y. Supp. 147. Similarly, a mother who
had children in a private school was held privileged to bring about the dismissal of
other children who were exerting immoral influences. Legres v. Marcotte (19o6)
129 Ill. App. 67. By statute in England a defense has been established to the pro-
curement of breaches of contracts of employment in connection with trades dis-
putes. Trades Dispute Act, (igo6) 6 Edw. VII, ch. 47, sec. 3. The instant case,
which does not come under that act, is apparently the first case to hold in the
absence of statute that there may be a justification for procuring a breach of con-
tract in the case of an industrial dispute. The court emphasized the fact that the
plaintiff was not paying a living wage. Whether the defendants would have been
justified in procuring the breach for the purpose of raising wages beyond a mini-
mum living wage is perhaps an open question.
TRADE-NAmE-APPLICATION TO GOODS OF DIFFERENT CLAssEs.-The defendants
used the word "Vogue" as a label on his hats with the letter "V" so large as to
dominate its surroundings. The plaintiff was a publisher of a magazine, known
as an arbiter of style, using this name and letter in the same manner. In a suit to
enjoin such use the lower court found for the plaintiff. Held, that the decree be
affirmed. Vogue Co. v. Thompson (1924, C. C. A. 6th) 300 Fed. 509.
Relief in all cases of unfair competition should depend on the question: Is the
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defendant trying to appropriate the good-will of the plaintiff through this use of
the trade-name? Anheuser-Busch v. Budweiser Malt Corp. (i921, S. D. N. Y.)
287 Fed. 243; Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf (915) 240 U. S. 403, 412,
36 Sup. Ct. 357, 36o; Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade (914)
27 HARV. L. REV. 139, 150; NOTES AND COMMENTS (913) ii MicH. L. REV. 391.
The plaintiff had trade value in his trade-name, an earned increment of value,
which the defendant appropriated by the technique of deceiving the public. He
thus received an unearned increment of value from the trade-name. American
Tobacco Co. v. Polacsek (I909, S. D. N. Y.) 17o Fed. 117, 121; Walter v. Ashton
[1902] 2 Ch. 282; Nims, Unfair Competition (2d ed. 1917) 35; Hopkins, Trade-
marks, Tradenames, and Unfair Competition (3d ed. 1917) 221; Garrard, Pre-
emption in Connection with Unfair Trade (1gig) ig COL. L. REV. 29, 45.
WILLs-ANNUITIEs-CONsTRUCTION OF PROVISIONS OF WILL-LEGACIES IN FOR-
EIGN CuRRENcy-In an action by executors for a judicial settlement of their
accounts and a construction of provisions of decedent's will, the sole question was
whether an annuity was payable at par or at the commercial rate of exchange for
francs. Held, that the testator meant gold francs, not mere paper promises 
to
pay francs. Chemical National Bank v. Butt (1924, Surro. Ct.) 123 Misc. 575. -
As an annuity connotes stability and recurrence, and the gold franc is standard
and stable, it is held that coin or its equivalent, and not paper currency, rising or
failing in value according to circumstances, must be paid. Graveley v. Graveley
(I885) 25 S. C. I; In re Hess' Will (1923, Surro. Ct) 120 Misc. 372, 
198 N. Y.
Supp. 573. Where gold and silver coins participated in the divergence 
of exchange,
either, or its equivalent value, could be paid. Volpe v. Benavides (i919, Tex. Civ.
App.) 214 S. W. 593. For discussion of the rate of exchange in the 
law of
damages, see COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 198; Gluck, The Rate
of Exchange in the Law of Damages (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 217.
WLLs-CoNsTRUCTIoNDECLARATIONS TO SCRIVENER ADMITTED 
TO SHOW TEs-
TATOR'S INTENT-The testator in the first clause of his will made bequests 
to his
"children" and "grandchildren" including a stepdaughter and her 
children. The
residue of the estate was divided equally among the "children and 
grandchildren
mentioned above." In a bill to construe the will, the lower court 
admitted in
,evidence the declarations of the testator to the scrivener that the stepdaughter 
and
her children were to share in the -residue. Held, that the evidence 
was admissible.
Von Fell v. Spirling (1924, N. J.) 124 AtI. 518.
The rule of evidence excluding the testator's expression of intention as to the
construction of his will, except in the one case of equivocation or latent ambiguity,
-has rarely been questioned. 'Day v. Webler (1919) 93 Conn. 308, 1o5 
At. 618;
Wigram, Extrinsic Evidence in Aid of the Interpretation of Wills (5th ed. 1914)
sec. 18; 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) secs. 2471, 2472. 
It rests on the
principle that no extrinsic utterances will be admitted to vary the written 
document.
5 Wigmore, loc. cit. supra; Kales, Interpreting of Writings (1918) 28 YALE 
LAW
JOURNAL, 33, 42. As the court points out, the evidence 
was not necessary to the
decision; and it was perhaps confused by cases admitting parol evidence 
on the
issues of undue influence, forgery, or the contents of a lost will.
WITNEss-PARTY'S IMPEACHMENT OF OWN WITNESs-ADMISSION 
IN EVIDENCE
OF SWORN STATEMENT PREVIOUSLY MADE-In a criminal prosecution, a 
govern-
ment witness testified contrary to his sworn statements previously 
made and gave
testimony tending to strengthen the defense. Claiming a surprise, 
the prosecution
was permitted to show the witness the sworn statement signed by him, 
and on his
denial of having made it, was allowed to prove the execution 
of it, and also to
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introduce it into evidence for purposes of impeachment. From a judgment of
conviction, the defendant appealed, assigning as error that the admission of this
evidence was a violation of the rule against impeachment of a party's own witness.
Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Sneed v. United States (1924, C. C. A. 5th)
298 Fed. gii.
Even after the crystallization, in the late eighteenth century, of the rule that
a party will not be allowed to impeach his own witnesses, testimony contradictory
to that of an earlier witness was admitted to establish the facts at issue in the
case but not to discredit the witness.. Friedlander v. London Ins. Co. (1832,
K. B.) 4 B. & Ad. i93; Buller, Nisi Prius (I8O6) 297; 2 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed. 1923) sec. 896 et seq. And where the witness testified contrary to a state-
ment he had previously made, it was held that witnesses might be called to establish
the making of the earlier statement but that the effect of the evidence should be
confined to the question of credibility. Wright v. Beckett (1834, C. P.) I M. & P.
414; contra: Holdsworth v. Mayor of Dartmouth (1838, N. P.) 2 M. & R_ 153.
Later, examination of the witness as to a previous statement was permitted but
other witnesses were not allowed to contradict his testimony in regard to such a
statement Melhuish v. Collier (185o, Q. B.) 15 Ad. & El. (N.* S.) 878. A
statute was then passed permitting the party to prove, for purposes of contradic-
tion, a prior inconsistent statement, if, in the opinion of the judge, the witness
was adverse. (1854) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, secs. 22 & 23. In the United States,
some courts allow the-questioning of the witness as to his previous statement for
the purpose of probing his recollection but do not permit proof of such statements
by extrinsic evidence even to impeach him. Bullard v. Pearsall (1873) 53 N. Y.
230; Hildreth v. Aldrich (1885) 15 P- I. 163, 1 At. 249; Hurley v. State (I889)
46 Ohio St. 320, 21 N. E. 645. Others not only admit the statement into evidence
for the purpose of impeaching the witness but also allow this impeachment by
extrinsic evidence when the party calling the witness claims a surprise and the
testimony is prejudicial. Hurlburt v. Bellows (187o) 5o N. H. 1O5; Selover v.
Bryant, Adm'r. (1893) Minn. 434, 56 N. W. 58. In some states, the matte'r is
regulated by statute. In the federal courts, the question of admissibility is left
to the discretion of the trial judge whose decision is made with reference to the
hostility of the witness, the surprise of the party calling him, and the prejudicial
nature of the testimony. Tacoma Power Co. v. Hays (igoi, C. C. A. 9th) iio
Fed. 496; Griffin Wheel Co. v. Smith (igog, C. C. A. 9th) 173 Fed. 245. The
instant case exemplifies the liberal tendency to give the trial court greater freedom
in ascertaining the facts in issue. Cf. May, Some Rules of Evidence (1877) I1
Am..L. REv. 261; NoTErs (i9o8) 42 Ams. L. REv. 757; Holtzoff, The New York
Rule as to Impeachment by a Party of His Own Witnesses (i924) 24 COL. L. REv.
715, 716.
